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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
then, did not constitute a breach of contract, but, rather was the.
termination of a factually advantageous expectancy (but even
this expectancy will receive protection against inducement if
other factors strongly suggest that a privilege be denied). 19 As
to (c), Wise bore no relation to the bank such as counsellor or
stockholder that would support the propriety of his conduct.
Finally, as to (d), Wise was prompted, not by ill will, but by
the desire to protect his own financial interests in connection
with an entirely collateral matter.
The purpose of the above digression is to suggest that the
true problem in Pack v. Wise revolves naturally and plausibly
around the considerations that determine when there has been
an actionable inducement of breach of contract. The court's re-
sort to the term "reasonableness" acquires a meaningful signifi-
cance when it is referred to the balancing of factors under this
tort. Since the tort of inducing breach of contract is not recog-
nized in Louisiana, the court did the best it could with what was
at hand. It may be feared, however, that its choice of the
theories of privacy or insult as applied to the facts can prove
unfortunate and may open a Pandora's box of troubles.
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
SURETYSHIP
In view of the great responsibility of personal sureties, one
would expect them to be more careful and exact in stating the
scope of their undertaking. Fortunately for them, the stricti
19. "[T]he overwhelming majority of the cases have held that interference with
employments or other contracts terminable at will is actionable, since until it is
terminated the contract is a subsisting relation, of value to the plaintiff, and pre-
sumably to continue in effect. The possibility of termination does, however, bear
upon the issue of the damages sustained, and it must be taken into account in
determining the defendant's privilege to interfere. So much more is allowed in
the way of interference to further the defendant's own legitimate interests where
the contract is subject to such termination, that contracts terminable at will might
very well be placed in an intermediate classification of their own, half way be-
tween contracts for a definite term and the mere expectancy of prospective ad-
vantage. The courts, however, do not appear to have recognized them as a separ-
ate group; and to avoid too much repetition, it seems desirable to consider them
with other contracts, with the recognition that they receive much more limited
protection." PROSSEB, ToRTS 956-57 (3d ed. 1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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juris rule of interpretation operates for their protection.' In
Clayton Mark & Co. v. Waller,2 the surety stipulated "I will be
personally responsible for any indebtedness of . . . up to
$5,000.00." The plaintiff claimed this was a continuing guar-
antee, but the court concluded (after an examination of the evi-
dence) that in the light of all the surrounding circumstances
the parties intended only the then existing and undetermined
indebtedness. This gave the surety the benefit of the ambiguity,
and his ultimate responsibility was reduced by the amount of
payments which had been made on the original debt.
Even a compensated commercial surety can not be held re-
sponsible in excess of its undertaking, but where the bond is one
required by statute, it is not always clear just what is the scope
of the liability which the surety must cover. In Loewer v. Du-
plechin, 3 the bond put up by the surety company for the defend-
ant's bonded warehouse, in compliance with the requirements of
RS. 54:250, stipulated that "the Principal shall honestly con-
duct said business, faithfully perform all duties and obligations
to all parties with said Principal as a warehouseman." (Empha-
sis added.) Then, the defendant (the principal) accepted rice
as the agent of a farmer for the purpose of selling it, but evi-
dently he failed to account for the rice. The trial court rendered
judgment against the surety on the basis that the defendant was
operating as a warehouseman. On this point, the majority of
the court of appeal reversed, maintaining that the defendant's
actions were not as a warehouseman, because R.S. 54:58 defines
a warehouseman as "a person lawfully engaged in the business
of storing goods for profit." A strong dissenting opinion con-
sidered the operations as those of a warehouseman, both on tech-
nical grounds of statutory interpretation of the Louisiana law
and on the basis of the general community understanding of the
scope of a warehouseman's functions. To say the least, it must
be a great disappointment to a farmer who turns over his rice
to a "bonded warehouse" for sale when he is told by the court
that he cannot recover on the bond because the defendant had
not acted "as a warehouseman." The question involved is a
closer one than might at first appear, and it is regrettable that
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3039 (1870).
2. 158 So. 2d 224 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
3. 161 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writ refused, 246 La. 80, 163 So. 2d
358 (1964)..
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the Supreme Court's denial of a writ precluded further exami-
nation of the issue.
MORTGAGES
Coen v. Gobert4 presented the unusual situation of a mort-
gage foreclosure seizure of a tract of land including a house
which had been moved to another location. The house was orig-
inally on the mortgaged land and was clearly covered by the
mortgage; if it had been removed without the knowledge or con-
sent of the mortgagee and had continued more or less intact, the
right of pursuit would follow the house to its new location.
However, in the case under discussion, the court found that the
removal of the house had been with the mortgagee's consent and
that the mortgage coverage had been lost by the creditor's re-
nunciation under Civil Code article 3411(5). In addition, the
original old frame house had undergone so many changes in be-
ing made over into a modern brick veneer building that this por-
tion of the thing mortgaged could be considered extinguished
under article 3411(1).
The case of Lamar Life Ins. Co. v. Babin5 has been through
several trials, including a rehearing before the Supreme Court,
and it has thus far produced more puzzling questions than satis-
fying answers. The creditor with a duly recorded conventional
mortgage containing a homestead waiver claimed payment in
preference to a prior-recorded judicial mortgage out of the
amount which would have been reserved as the homestead of
the judgment debtor if he had properly claimed it. As the case
now stands, the Supreme Court has remanded it to determine
whether the property was the debtor's bona fide homestead,
without passing upon the court of appeal's holding that the bene-
fit of the homestead exemption is personal to the homeowner.
In Kinnebrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp.,6 the question at issue
centered on the interpretation of Act 215 of 1910, now R.S.
9:5141, which provides that mortgages and privileges are ef-
fective against all persons from the time of filing, as distin-
guished from the actual inscription into the record books. Pre-
vious decisions of the courts of appeal had interpreted this stat-
4. 154 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
5. 246 La. 19, 163 So. 2d 81 (1964); 148 So. 2d 366 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1962).
6. 244 La. 879, 154 So. 2d 433 (1963), affirming 147 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962).
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ute along with article XIX, section 19, of the 1921 Constitution,
reaching the conclusion that actual recordation was required and
if timely done gave an effective date as of the time of filing.7 In
the present Kinnebrew case, the court of appeal expressed dis-
agreement with the requirement of actual inscription in addition
to the filing, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Upon careful examination of the facts, the Supreme Court
concluded that this expression by the court of appeal was "gra-
tuitously made, and not necessary for a determination of the liti-
gation, inasmuch as the lien and mortgage sought to be enforced
by these plaintiffs were actually inscribed." The actual inscrip-
tion was made within three days of the filing and this delay was
accounted for by the fact that the instrument was filed late on
a Friday afternoon. Accordingly, the inscription on Monday was
reasonably prompt, and its effectiveness was held to date from
the filing on Friday -in accordance with the clear language of
the statute, and affirming the decision of the court of appeal.
The really troublesome questions in the interpretation of the
statute - if actual inscription does not take place, or is exces-
sively delayed - did not have to be answered for the disposition
of this case and the Supreme Court specifically pretermitted
any expression of opinion.9
In Rex Fin. Co. v. Cary, 10 the Supreme Court held that a
mortgage foreclosure was good because they found that the
owner of the note had no notice of its defect and was therefore
a "holder in due course" so that any existing equities between
the immediate parties could not be urged against him. This left
unanswered the question raised by the dictum in the court of
appeal's opinion that the effective date of a collateral mortgage
is not the date of recordation of the mortgage but the date of
issuance of the current hand note which represents an existing
indebtedness." This point about collateral mortgages is more
directly a part of the ratio decidendi in the more recent case of
Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc.,"2 which will be discussed more
fully in a later issue of this Review.
7. Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 9 La. App. 720, 119 So. 770 (1929).
8. 244 La. at 884, 154 So. 2d at 435.
9. Id. at 894, 154 So. 2d at 438.
10. 244 La. 675, 154 So. 2d 360 (1963), affirming 145 So. 2d 672 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962).
11. 145 So. 2d at 676.
12. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), writ refused, "... no error of
law," 167 So. 2d 677 (La. 1964), two Justices dissenting.
19651
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Morrison v. Faulk1" presented the issue of a competition
between a chattel mortgage and a lessor's privilege. There was
no dispute about the fact that the lessor's privilege had attached
to the effects in question prior to the chattel mortgage, which
was recorded only after delivery of the objects (several cash
registers). However, the holder of the chattel mortgage urged
that the lessor's privilege had been extinguished when the claim
for rent had been merged in a judgment. Generally, a cause of
action is considered extinguished when merged in a judgment
so that a new suit can not be instituted on the original cause of
action; but when this judgment at the same time contains a
recognition of the lessor's original privilege with priority over
the inferior lien of the chattel mortgage, it is hardly in order
for the holder of the latter to claim the extinguishment of the
superior privilege. Nor does it make any difference that, in
subsequent stages of the procedure, the lessor was the sheriff's-
sale purchaser of the lessee's right of occupancy.
There is a dictum in this case that the Deficiency Judgment
Act 14 "applies only in those instances where there has been a
waiver of appraisement by the debtor, and the creditor takes
advantage of such waiver .... The record leaves us with the
impression that if there was no formal appraisement it was due
solely to an oversight on the part of the sheriff's office."'15 In
view of the strictness with which the public policy nature of this
law is stressed in the statute 6 and in the decisions applying
it, 17 the cited dictum may be encouraging an unduly loose and
liberal interpretation of the Deficiency Judgment Act.
BUILDING CONSTRUCTION PRIVILEGES
In Broadmoor Lumber Co. i. Liberto,18 the plaintiff supplied
materials to a contractor who prefabricated some shelves or
cabinets which he then installed in a grocery store. Presumably,
the property owner paid the contractor, but the contractor did
not pay the lumber company. The trial court rendered judg-
13. 158 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, "... result is cor-
rect," 245 La. 643, 160 So. 2d 229 (1964).
14. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950).
15. 158 So. 2d at 840.
16. LA. R.S. 13:4107 (1950).
17. See Soileau v. Pitre, 79 So. 2d 628 (La. App. lst Cir. 1955).
18. 162 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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mert by default against the contractor, andthere was no appeal.
;Insofar as the owner was concerned, the trial court rendered
*a judgment in personam against him for the amount claimed,
together with recognition of a materialman's privilege against
the property. The court of appeal made a careful examination
of the facts surrounding the construction and installation of the
shelves (or cabinets) and concluded that they were movables
because they had not been "attached permanently" within the
meaning of Civil Code article 469 to become immovable by
destination.
Then the court held that "since the lien statute [R.S. 9:4812]
is restricted to immovables and since the plaintiff has no re-
course against the owner except by virtue of the lien statute, ...
plaintiff cannot recover for the materials . . .used in the con-
struction of the cabinets."'19 This rationale is not clear. For
the application of the statute, is it necessary that the work it-
self constitute an immovable, that the work be done on an im-
-movable, or that the privilege operate only on immovable prop-
erty? The two pertinent parts of the statutory text are "any
person furnishing service or material or performing any labor
on the said building or other work" and "a privilege upon the
building or other structure and upon the land." Neither of these
refer to the repair or installation work, but rather to the prop-
erty on which the repair or installation was done and to the
property on which the privilege is created. Accordingly, the
movable or immovable classification of the shelves is irrelevant
unless it can be said that their construction and installation did
not constitute the furnishing of material or labor "on the said
building" - in which event a different kind of rationale would
be appropriate. The movable or immovable classification of
the shelves themselves might then not be so important. Is the
manufacturer of prefabricated cabinets who aims at greater
simplicity in their installation progressing in the wrong direc-
tion for his own welfare?
The case of Abry Brothers, Inc. v. Tillman was decided by
the court of appeal 20 prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Crochet,2" so that when the Abry case got
to the Supreme Court,22 the Crochet holding was directly ap-
19. Id. at 804.
20. 148 So. 2d 804 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
21. 244 La. 1060, 156 So. 2d 438 (1963).
22. 245 La. 1017, 162 So. 2d 346 (1964).
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plied. The issues of inscription and reinscription of the claim,
as well as the prescription of the right in rem and the right in
personam, have been discussed in prior issues of this Review."
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Lincoln Parish School Board v. Ruston College1 presented
the question (first impression) of whether a school board could
acquire title to property by thirty-year prescription. In 1887,
Robert Russ donated a tract of land to Ruston College, which
used the property until it ceased functioning in 1895. Then
there was a gap not explained in the evidence, following which
the property was used as a public school site until the building
burned in 1910. The school board then called a successful elec-
tion to raise money for the construction of a new building, which
became Ruston High School. The evidence establishes a con-
tinued uninterrupted possession of the property by the school
board as owner from 1911.
The trial court held in favor of the school board, and the
court of appeal affirmed. Several Louisiana and other civil
law authorities are appropriately cited to show that a school
board in Louisiana is a body corporate created by the state
vested with express power to acquire and alienate property as
well as the right to sue and be sued. The right to acquire land
by prescription is necessarily included in this power properly
vested in a properly created legal person; nor is there any prohi-
bition to exclude such a right. The argument that a school board
possesses only limited or restrictive powers is not apposite here
because the question at issue is within the granted powers.
One of the policy reasons underlying the civil law institution
of acquisitive prescription is to confirm the ownership of a
23. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term -
Security Devices, 24 LA. L. REV. 205, 208-10 (1964) ; Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 943
(1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 162 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 355, 164
So.2d 354 (1964).
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